With the RBI
and Government tugging at extremes, the middle ground is better
RBI
Watch Monetary
Policy 2015-16
I had
written on this subject on October 22, 2014. Please read this blog to
get the full picture.
I place
below the relevant section.
"What
should be the process for deciding the course of monetary policy?
The
Urjit Patel Committee suggested moving the responsibility from the Governor of
the RBI to a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). This makes sense.
The
Committee suggested that the MPC should consist of the Governor, a Deputy
Governor, an Executive Director of RBI, and two external members picked by the
RBI. My view is that to start with, we need a small MPC of four members
consisting equally of internal and external members. I suggest two
external members, both persons of independent standing with experience in
fields such as of banking, finance, industry (agriculture or manufacturing) and
sociology. Government should pick these members in consultation with the
Governor. The two internal members will be the Governor and a Deputy
Governor in charge of monetary policy at the RBI. In the event of a tie, the
Governor should cast one additional vote.”
Last
week the government released a revised
version of the draft Indian Financial Code. Clause 256 page 122 covers
the detail regarding the composition and voting by members of the MPC. The
clause indicates that the MPC would consist of seven members - four appointed
by Government and three from the RBI. The MPC will determine the policy
rate by majority vote.
I hold
to my view, which is that the MPC should consist of an equal number of members
from within and outside the RBI.
Why
should the RBI have a majority in the MPC? Surely, there are people with
expertise outside the RBI on monetary policy, and it makes for better decision
making if such members are equally represented on the MPC. On the flip side,
what justification does government have for the MPC to have a majority of
government appointed members? I do not see any grounds for this, irrespective
of the yardstick that is used – expertise or responsibility. It is the MPC's
function and not the government's to set the policy rate.
I do
believe, at this juncture, that
the Governor (the IFC refers to a new title: chairperson!) of the RBI should be
given an enhanced power to cast an additional vote in case of a tie in
the votes, i.e all four members vote, and should there be a tie, then the
Governor casts his additional vote.
Why?
The intricacies of inflation targeting is in its infancy in India, the concept
of an independent committee setting interest rates is yet to be
institutionalised, and expertise in both monetary policy and markets is scarce
to find. In this scenario, I would argue that the Governor, an individual
picked for his/her superior expertise on monetary matters and professional
integrity – whose performance, all said and done, will be judged by whether he
or she achieves the inflation target, although it is the MPC which is formally
responsible - should be given an enhanced voting power at the MPC.
Can the
same argument not be used to give the Governor the power of veto? I
believe this is not the right governance in a public institution of high
standing consisting of experts. If the Governor is in a minority in one
particular round of voting at the MPC, then it is only fair for the Governor to
accept his position.